

# Customer Training Workshop Traveo™ II Device Security

Q1 2021



# Target Products

## > Target product list for this training material


Family Category	Series	Code Flash Memory Size
Traveo™ II Automotive Body Controller Entry	CYT2B6	Up to 576KB
Traveo II Automotive Body Controller Entry	CYT2B7	Up to 1088KB
Traveo II Automotive Body Controller Entry	CYT2B9	Up to 2112KB
Traveo II Automotive Body Controller Entry	CYT2BL	Up to 4160KB
Traveo II Automotive Body Controller High	CYT3BB/4BB	Up to 4160KB
Traveo II Automotive Body Controller High	CYT4BF	Up to 8384KB
Traveo II Automotive Cluster	CYT3DL	Up to 4160KB
Traveo II Automotive Cluster	CYT4DN	Up to 6336KB

# Introduction to Traveo II Body Controller Entry

## > Device Security is in “CPU and Memory” and “Peripheral Interconnect”

**Hint Bar**

**Review TRM chapters 13 and 27 for additional details**




# Introduction to Traveo II Body Controller High

## Device Security is in “CPU and Memory” and “Peripheral Interconnect”

**Hint Bar**

**Review TRM chapters 13 and 27 for additional details**




# Introduction to Traveo II Cluster

## › Device Security is in “CPU and Memory” and “Peripheral Interconnect”

**Hint Bar**

**Review TRM chapters 13 and 27 for additional details**



# Device Security Overview

- › Traveo™ II provides advanced security to protect user designs from unauthorized access and copying
- › Features
  - Lifecycle stage
  - Memory and Peripheral Protection<sup>1</sup>
    - Memory Protection Units (MPU)
    - Shared Memory Protection Unit (SMPU)
    - Peripheral Protection Units (PPU)
  - Flash Write and eFuse Read/Write Protection
    - Software Protection Units (SWPU)
  - Cryptography (Crypto) block

## Hint Bar

**Review the Device Security and Cryptography Block TRM chapters for additional details**

<sup>1</sup> For details of MPU, SMPU, and PPU see the Protection Unit section

# Lifecycle Stages



- › Traveo II has the following nonvolatile and irreversible lifecycle stages:
  - NORMAL\_PROVISIONED
  - SECURE
  - SECURE\_WITH\_DEBUG
  - RMA
  - CORRUPTED
- › ROM/Flash boot determines protection states based on the lifecycle stage
- › DAP, PC1, and PCx are protected according to the protection state

## Hint Bar

**Review the Device Security TRM chapter for additional details**

# Lifecycle Stage Transitions

- › Lifecycle stages transition by blowing the fuse of eFuse
- › eFuse cannot be changed once programmed



Hint Bar

**Review the Device Security TRM chapter for additional details**



# Lifecycle Stage Transitions

Lifecycle Stage	Description
NORMAL_PROVISIONED	Customers receive parts in this lifecycle stage.
SECURE	This is the lifecycle stage of a secure device. Access restrictions in SECURE mode are controlled by eFuse settings.
SECURE_WITH_DEBUG	This is similar to the SECURE lifecycle stage, except with NORMAL access restrictions applied to enable debugging, even if authentication fails. Devices that are in this stage are only used by developers and testers.
RMA	Devices can be brought into this stage so that Cypress can perform a failure analysis.
CORRUPTED	This stage is entered in case an error is detected when the boot process tries to determine the current lifecycle stage.


## Hint Bar

**Review the Device Security TRM chapter for additional details**

# Memory and Peripheral Protection

## > Overview

- The MPU/SMPU/PPU restrict access to memory or peripheral address space
  - Internal attack protection
    - Prevents unauthorized code or bus masters from reading protection areas
  - External attack protection
    - Restricts access from unauthorized external equipment




### Hint Bar

Review the Device Security TRM chapter and the Program and Debug Interface TRM chapter for additional details

# Memory and Peripheral Protection

## > Use Case


- Allow debugger access to the CPU after password authentication
  - **Debugger sends the password to SRAM**
  - Generate a password authentication interrupt from the debugger
  - CM0+ executes password authentication
  - Allow access to the CPU after password authentication



# Memory and Peripheral Protection

## > Use Case


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# Memory and Peripheral Protection

## > Use Case


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# Memory and Peripheral Protection

## > Use Case

- Allow debugger access to the CPU after password authentication
  - Debugger sends the password to SRAM
  - Generate a password authentication interrupt from the debugger
  - CM0+ executes password authentication
  - **Allow access to the CPU after password authentication**



(Note: The password authentication process is implemented by the user in software)

# Flash Write and eFuse Read/Write Protection

## > Overview

- Traveo II has software protection units (SWPUs)<sup>1</sup> that support:
  - Permissions for flash writing and erasing
  - Permissions for eFuse reading and writing

## > Advantage

- Prevents malicious or inadvertent modification of flash or eFuse
- Prevents reading of eFuse protection data

### Hint Bar

**Review the Device Security TRM chapter for additional details**

<sup>1</sup> SWPUs are stored in Supervisory Flash (SWPU details will be updated in a later revision)

# Crypto Overview

- › Crypto provides hardware implementation and acceleration of cryptographic functions
- › Features
  - Cryptography function:
    - Symmetric key ciphers
    - Hashing
    - Asymmetric key ciphers
    - Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)
    - True Random Number Generator (TRNG)
    - Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC)
  - Secure Hardware Extension (SHE)<sup>1</sup>
  - Hardware Security Module (HSM)<sup>1</sup>


## Hint Bar

Review the **Cryptography Block TRM** chapter for additional details

<sup>1</sup> The SHE and HSM solutions are provided by a third party



# Crypto Block Diagram




## Hint Bar

Review the **Cryptography Block TRM** chapter for additional details

# Hardware-Based Cryptography IP

- › Asymmetric key ciphers
  - RSA and ECC
- › Symmetric key ciphers
  - TDES: 64-bit length using a 64-bit key
  - AES: 128-bit length and programmable key length (128/192/256-bit key)
  - Chacha20: 512 random-looking bits



## Hint Bar


Review the Cryptography Block TRM chapter for additional details

# Hardware-Based Cryptography IP

- > Hashing: SHA1, SHA2, and SHA3 hashes
- > PRNG: Generate in a fixed range using three LFSRs
- > TRNG: Generate using ring oscillators
- > CRC: Programmable polynomial of up to 32 bits

Hint Bar

**Review the Cryptography Block TRM chapter for additional details**




# Secure System Implementation

- > The cryptography IP can be accessed only by the secure master (CM0+)
- > Requests to CM0+ must be made via system calls using IPC from CM4/CM7

Hint Bar


Review the Cryptography Block TRM chapter for additional details



# Digital Signature Verification with Asymmetric Key Ciphers

## > Use Case


- Traveo II can support digital signatures by controlling the hardware IP with software
  - Step 1: Distribute the public key



# Digital Signature Verification with Asymmetric Key Ciphers

## > Use Case


- Step 2:
  - First, using the hash function, calculate the hash value of the data.
  - Next, encrypt the hash value using the private key.
  - Finally, add the encrypted hash value as "signature" to the created data and send it.



# Digital Signature Verification with Asymmetric Key Ciphers

## > Use Case


- Step 3:
  - First, decrypt the encrypted hash value using the public key.
  - Next, calculate the hash value of the received data using the same hash function as the sender.
  - Finally, compare the decrypted hash value with the calculated hash value. If they match, the data is correct.



# Authentication of Communication Partner

## > Use Case

- Random numbers and encryption are used to authenticate the CAN communication partner
  - Step 1: Master ECU transmits the generated random number



**Step 1:** Transmit the random number to the Slave MCU

### Hint Bar

Review the **Cryptography Block TRM** chapter for additional details




# Authentication of Communication Partner

## > Use Case

- Step 2: The slave ECU encrypts the received random number with Key#3 and sends it to the master ECU

### Hint Bar

Review the **Cryptography Block TRM** chapter for additional details



**Step 1:** Transmit the random number to the Slave MCU

**Step 2:** Encrypt the received random number with key #3 and send it to the Master MCU


# Authentication of Communication Partner

## > Use Case

- Step 3: The master ECU decrypts the received encrypted data with Key#3

### Hint Bar

Review the Cryptography Block TRM chapter for additional details




# Authentication of Communication Partner

## > Use Case

- Step 4: The master ECU checks whether the decrypted data and the transmitted RNG are the same, and authenticates the communication partner if they are the same

### Hint Bar

Review Cryptography Block TRM chapter for additional details





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# Revision History

Revision	ECN	Submission Data	Description of Change
**	6152725	04/29/2018	Initial release
*A	6396994	07/31/2018	Added pages 2, 7, 8, 24, and 25 Updated pages 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, and 19
*B	6678028	09/18/2018	Added page 2 Updated page 3, 4, 5, 20, 21, 22, 23 - Delete CYT2B5 series
*C	6824363	03/04/2020	Added page: 20, 21, 22 Updated page: 3 to 26 (Hint Bar), 9 to 13 (Contents) Deleted page: 27, 28 (delete the appendix pages)
*D	7082696	02/03/2021	Updated pages 2, 3, 4, 5. Convert content to IFX format